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Objectives: Our aim was to evaluate Korea’s Pandemic Influenza Preparedness
Plan.
Methods: We conducted a sensitivity analysis on the expected number of
outpatients and hospital bed occupancy, with 1,000,000 parameter combina-
tions, in a situation of pandemic influenza, using the mathematical simulation
program InfluSim.
Results: Given the available resources in Korea, antiviral treatment and social
distancing must be combined to reduce the number of outpatients and hospi-
talizations sufficiently; any single intervention is not enough. The antiviral
stockpile of 4e6% is sufficient for the expected eligible number of cases to be
treated. However, the eligible number assumed (30% for severe cases and 26% for
extremely severe cases) is very low compared to the corresponding number in
European countries, where up to 90% of the population are assumed to be eligible
for antiviral treatment.
Conclusions: A combination of antiviral treatment and social distancing can
mitigate a pandemic, but will only bring it under control for the most optimistic
parameter combinations.1. Introduction
It is necessary to evaluate a nation’s pandemic
influenza preparedness plan for whether it effectively
reflects the capacity of the public health system onibuted under the terms o
y-nc/3.0) which permits un
is properly cited.
ase Control and Preventiona national basis. Several papers have reported that an
influenza pandemic can stretch the capacity of a nation’s
health system [1e3]. Some studies use static models
without parameter sensitivity analysis but consider a few
fixed values for attack rates, hospitalization rates, andf the Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License
restricted non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in
. Published by Elsevier Korea LLC. All rights reserved.
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
nt
s 
pe
r 1
00
,
00
0
A
Korea’s pandemic influenza preparedness plan 211mortality rates [4e10], and a few consider the thera-
peutic use of neuraminidase inhibitors [5,8,10]. As
pharmaceutical and nonpharmaceutical interventions
can change the course of a pandemic, any sensitivity
analysis must include whether these can lower the
burden on the national public health system to
a manageable level.
However, this evaluation is difficult because we do
not know the contagiousness of any upcoming unknown
influenza strain. Here, we defined feasible ranges for the
parameters of a future influenza pandemic, and then
randomly sampled from these ranges. For each combi-
nation of sampled parameter values, we simulated the
course of the pandemic wave using InfluSim software
(http://www.influsim.info) [11,12]. We thereby gener-
ated a whole range of plausible influenza pandemics for
which we could evaluate how many persons would seek
medical help or need hospitalization. Simulations were
conducted both with and without interventions, and the
effects of the intervention were then estimated for each
set of parameter values.0
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We conducted the sensitivity analysis using InfluSim
version 2.1, a deterministic compartment model that
extends the ‘susceptibleeexposedeinfectiouseremoved’
(SEIR) model by using clinical and demographic
parameters relevant for pandemic preparedness planning
[11,12]. The simulation produces daily time courses and
cumulative numbers of influenza cases, outpatients, andTable 1. Parameter values
Randomly sampled parameters Ranges
Infection and disease
Basic reproduction number 1.5e3.5
Initial infectivity of infected individuals (%) 75e95
Fraction of infections remaining
asymptomatic (%)
25e50
Relative infectivity of asymptomatic
individuals (%)
0e100
Hospitalization factor 0.5e1.5
Antiviral treatment
Reduction in infectivity of treated cases (%) 60e98
Reduction in hospitalization of treated
cases (%)
49e69
Social distancing
Contact reduction in the general
population (%)
5e25
Contact reduction of moderately sick
cases (%)
0e20
Contact reduction of severely sick
cases at home (%)
10e30
Contact reduction of hospitalized
cases (%)
20e40hospitalizations using demographic parameters from
Korea (see the Appendix).
The default setting of InfluSim parameters is that
about one-third of infected individuals will become
severely ill and seek medical care. Patients seeking
medical care are “outpatients.” The distribution of
outpatients delayed visits is exponential, which means
that patients visit hospitals/clinics some time after onset
of symptoms, on average after 24 hours. If patients seek
medical care within 48 hours after the onset of their
symptoms, they are given antiviral treatment, which
reduces the duration and degree of infectivity and the
chance of hospitalization [13].0.75 0.85 0.95
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Figure 1. The number of outpatients in a no-intervention
scenario (population size 100,000 individuals). (A) Epidemic
curves for nine out of 100,000 realizations, representing the
10%, 20%, ., 90% percentiles of all realizations. (B)
Parameter values from normal distributions (means given in
bold, with 99% of the values lying within the ranges specified
by dotted lines). R0Z basic reproduction number; x50Z
cumulative infectivity during the first half of the symptomatic
period; cAZ fraction of infections remaining asymptomatic;
bAZ relative infectivity of asymptomatic compared to symp-
tomatic cases; fkZ factor by which the InfluSim default
percentage of hospitalizations was varied. (C) Distribution of
the cumulative number of outpatients. (D) Correlation between
the cumulative number of outpatients and the number of
outpatients on the peak day.
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Figure 2. Effects of social distancing, antiviral treatment, and a combination of both interventions compared to the no-
intervention scenario. (A) Total number of outpatient visits; (B) outpatient visits prevented as a percentage of the no-
intervention scenario; (C) total number of hospitalizations; (D) hospitalizations prevented as a percentage of the no-intervention
scenario.
212 C. Chu, et alAs many parameters of future viruses and interven-
tion effects are uncertain, we performed sensitivity
analyses by randomly choosing values for the key
parameters listed in Table 1 for given ranges. All
parameter samples were taken randomly assuming
normal distributions with a mean value in the middle of
the interval given in Table 1 and a 99% confidence
interval (see Figure 1B below). A total of 1,000,000
different combinations of parameter values were
sampled and a set of four simulations performed for the
following scenarios: no intervention, social distancing
(contact reduction) only, antiviral treatment only, and
a combination of both. Social distancing can cause
reduce the number of contacts in the general population
and for cases with different levels of disease severity0
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Figure 3. Simulation results of different intervention scenarios
outpatient visits per physician in practice; (B) left axis: peak percen
right axis: peak percentage of available intensive care unit (ICU) b(Table 1). Antiviral treatment is given on average 24
hours (but not later than 48 hours) after the onset of
symptoms; it reduces the infectivity of patients and the
course of their disease, thus preventing a proportion of
hospitalizations (Table 1).
From each simulation, the peak number of outpa-
tients, the cumulative number of outpatients, the peak
hospital bed occupancy, and the cumulative number of
hospitalizations were extracted. To evaluate the effects
of the different interventions, each simulation outcome
was divided by the result of the no-intervention
scenario. Finally, we related our results to the avail-
able number of hospital beds [14] and the number of
physicians in practice (general medicine, internal
medicine, and pediatrics) [15].Pe
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Figure 4. Demand for intensive care. The curves show the percentage of the currently available intensive care unit (ICU) beds in
Korea, assuming that 15% of hospitalized patients need intensive care. The horizontal lines indicate 50% and 100% of the available
ICU capacity. The gray areas under the curves indicate what percentage of cases needing ICU care cannot receive proper treatment
if at most 50% of ICU beds can be made available for influenza patients. (A) Social distancing alone; (B) social distancing
combined with antiviral treatment.
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This parameter sensitivity analysis has revealed some
interesting properties of an influenza pandemic in
Korea. As expected, the basic reproduction number and
distribution of contagiousness over the infectious period
have the largest effect on the course of the epidemic.
Other parameters describing the contagiousness of cases
in the late prodromal period and the contagiousness of
asymptomatic and moderate cases compared to severe
cases have only a moderate effect on the course of the
epidemic. Interestingly, an increased contagiousness of
moderately sick individuals reduces the peak and
cumulative number of cases.
The antiviral stockpile of 4e6% is sufficient for the
expected eligible number of cases to be treated.
However, the eligible number assumed (30% for severe
cases and 26% for extremely severe cases) is very low
compared to the equivalent figure in European countries,
where up to 90% of the population are assumed to be
eligible for antiviral treatment [16]. The two parameters
describing the effect of antiviral treatment, i.e., the
reduction in the duration of the contagious period and
the reduction in the contagiousness of treated individ-
uals, have only a minor effect on the simulation results.
The general reduction of contacts has a large effect
on the course of the epidemic, while the threshold for
closing schools has only a minor effect. This can be
explained by the small overall effect of school closure
even though Korea has a larger fraction of school chil-
dren than most European countries. However, the school
closure threshold has been investigated for very small
threshold values. The use of a deterministic simulator
such as InfluSim may not be adequate to address the
analysis of optimal school closure thresholds.
Comparing the effect of social distancing interven-
tions with antiviral treatment, social distancing inter-
ventions clearly have a larger effect. This can beexplained by the small fraction of individuals eligible
for treatment (26e30%). However, additional prophy-
laxis for healthcare workers and essential service
workers will rapidly exploit the antiviral stockpile, so
that treatment of cases will no longer be possible and the
overall effect will be negative.4. Discussion
It is important to consider ranges of parameter values.
Sampling random values from reasonable intervals
translates input uncertainty into expected output vari-
ability. The wide regions of tolerance for the total
number of outpatients and hospitalizations (Figure 1)
show that pandemic preparedness plans should consider
“best case” and “worst case” scenarios, not “average
case” scenarios.
The most important parameter that determines both
the duration and the height of a pandemic is the basic
reproduction number, R0. However, there is a wide
range of proposed values for past pandemics and for
seasonal influenza, ranging from 1.5 to 4 [17e21].
Many authors have adopted Longini’s containment
strategies for R0, using a value of 1.1e2.4 [22]. Fergu-
son et al’s R0 for 1918 pandemic data should be regar-
ded as an effective reproduction number that also
reflects the effect of interventions, and they proposed
R0Z 1.7 as “moderate” and R0Z 2.0 as “high” trans-
mission scenarios [23]. We explored a wider range of
pandemics (R0Z 1.5e3.5) and also considered hospital
bed occupancy and intensive care unit (ICU) demand.
The effects of antiviral treatment depend on the
patients’ treatment time and on where they have already
spent most of the contagious period before treatment.
The success of social distancing measures depends on
the compliance of the population. At the most pessi-
mistic end of our simulations (high R0 and a strong
214 C. Chu, et alconcentration of contagiousness in the early phase of the
infection, combined with low public health compliance
and low treatment effects), the number of hospitaliza-
tions can be 1.9 times higher than the mean, whereas at
the most optimistic end, a major outbreak may be pre-
vented (cf. the 99% interval for the combined inter-
vention in Figure 2C).
Our study confirms the results of previous studies
using static models [5,8] that have pointed out ICU
capacity as a bottleneck in hospital settings, and have
stated that appropriate contingency planning must
consider a rapid expansion of ICU capacity. We show
that, in pessimistic cases, a non-negligible percentage of
hospitalized patients (ranging from 5.5% to 39.5%)
would be at a higher risk of death if 50% of the currently
existing ICU beds could be made available at the peak
of the epidemic. We believe that, as ICU capacity is
difficult to expand and costly to maintain, additional
measures must be considered and extensive preparation
will be needed. This includes occupational safety
measures and the development of triage policies
(Figures 3 and 4).Acknowledgements
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Table A1. Age distribution of the Korean population (per 10influenza by age class and risk group
Children Adults Elderly
Age (years) 0e5 6e12 13e19 20e39 40e59 60
Number per 100,000 6,969 9,780 9,319 34,214 27,021 12,697
Total number in class 26,068 61,235 12,697
Contacts per week 0e5 6e12 13e19 20e39 40e59 60
With 0e5-year-olds 169.14 31.47 17.76 34.5 15.83 11.47
With 6e12-year-olds 31.47 274.51 32.31 34.86 20.61 11.50
With 13e19-year-olds 17.76 32.31 224.25 50.75 37.52 14.96
With 20e39-year-olds 34.5 34.86 50.75 75.66 49.45 25.08
With 40e59-year-olds 15.83 20.61 37.52 49.45 61.26 32.99
With 60-year-olds 11.47 11.50 14.96 25.08 32.99 54.23
Risk category Low risk High risk Low risk High risk Low risk High risk
Fraction of age class (%) 90 10 85 1 60 40
Fraction of infected individuals who become
severely sick (%)
33 33 33 33 33 33
Fraction of severely sick patients who need
hospitalization (%)
0.18 1.33 2.33 2.76 3.56 7.76
Fraction of hospitalized patients who die (%) 5.54 16.53 39.50
